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Post-Watergate: The Legal
Profession and Respect for the
Interests of Third Parties
Laurel A. Rigertas*
INTRODUCTION
As a result of Watergate, disciplinary proceedings were
brought against at least twenty-nine lawyers, which resulted in
disciplinary action against at least eighteen of them.1 Their
misconduct included aiding and abetting burglary, obstruction of
justice, perjury, violation of campaign laws and conspiracy to
violate citizens' constitutional rights, among other charges.2 As a
result of lawyers' involvement in Watergate, the American Bar
Association (ABA) worked to improve ethical standards for
lawyers to rehabilitate the profession's tarnished reputation.
The ABA's reform efforts included the enactment of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983 and the
adoption of a requirement that all ABA accredited law schools
provide legal ethics education.3 Subsequent events involving
lawyers, however, should cause the legal profession to question
whether these reforms adequately help lawyers navigate their
often competing roles while maintaining the trust and respect of
the public that is necessary to sustain our legal system.
There are many lenses through which one can view the
events of Watergate.4 This article, however, suggests that much
*Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University, College of Law; J.D. University of
Minnesota; B.S. James Madison University. I would like to thank the Chapman Law
Review for the opportunity to speak at their symposium, The 40th Anniversary of
Watergate: A Commemoration of the Rule of Law. I also want to thank Daniel S.
Reynolds and Ronald D. Rotunda for their comments on an earlier draft and Bryant
Storm and Lindsay Vanek for their research assistance.
1 N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges against Twenty-Nine
Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1337 (Oct. 1976).
2 Infra Part I.B.
3 Infra Part II.D.
4 See, e.g., Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 61, 61 (2003) (looking at Watergate as concerning the role
of an attorney for an organization when the attorney learns of misconduct by those acting
for the organization); Fred D. Thompson, One Lawyer's Perspective on Watergate, 27
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of the conduct of the lawyers who were disciplined as a result of
Watergate violated the interests of third parties, which included
both individuals5 and the broader community.6 If the lawyers
had been trained and sensitized to assess the impact of their
conduct on the interests of third parties, perhaps some of them
would have paused and considered their choices more carefully.
Instead, many of them seemed to have pursued the interests of
their client or superior zealously and without any consideration
of the impact on third parties.7 Viewing the conduct of the
lawyers through this lens may help inform our understanding of
subsequent events where the public has felt betrayed by lawyers'
conduct. The conduct of lawyers frequently has serious and
foreseeable consequences on third parties that are a byproduct of
zealous advocacy. This outcome is frequently proper in our
adversarial system, but sometimes it is not. The public's disdain
for the legal profession is particularly acute in these
circumstances. 8
Thus, forty years after Watergate, the legal profession
should question whether it adequately inculcates in lawyers not
only respect for the rule of law but also, specifically, respect for
the interests of third parties. This is not to suggest that a lawyer
will, or should, frequently allow consideration of a third party's
interests to trump the lawyer's duty of loyalty to his or her client.
Indeed, the proper execution of a lawyer's duties will often
demand the lawyer put his or her client's interests first, even
when it harms the interests of others.
That conclusion, however, should not preclude a lawyer, who
is an agent of justice in addition to being an advocate, from
routinely assessing the consequences of his or her conduct on the
OKLA. L. REV. 226, 226 (1974) (viewing the events of Watergate as generating precedents
that will govern the future relationship of the executive and legislative branches); Richard
D. Schwartz, After Watergate, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 3, 4 (1973) (seeing the events of
Watergate as illustrating "the danger that governmental use of information control can
threaten freedom of choice in the political process"); John Blake, Forgetting a Key Lesson
from Watergate?, CNN.com (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/
watergate-reformlindex.html?iref=allsearch (viewing Watergate as a campaign finance
scandal).
5 See infra notes 93, 96 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., In the Matter of Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (suspending
attorney Claude Wild from the practice of law for one year following his conviction for
violating campaign finance laws and quoting the sentencing judge who noted that the
crime may be one worse than a crime of violence because it "is corrupting our
government").
7 Infra Part I.B.
s See John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts Into
Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV.
323, 333 (2008) (lack of civility and overly aggressive tactics may not necessarily be
ethical violations but the public frequently views them harshly and with distaste).
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interests of third parties. Perhaps through that viewpoint some
misconduct could be averted. Furthermore, even when a lawyer
concludes that the law properly demands action of him or her
that will harm the interests of third parties, this reflection may
allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the law
allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible
course of action; in other words, to advise the client on the right
thing to do. These moments of reflection may also allow for
important consideration of whether the law as written has struck
the right balance between loyalty to one's client and the interests
in justice, or whether reform is necessary. Lastly, if the public
viewed lawyers as a group that is constantly mindful of how its
conduct affects other people, that perspective may aid in
improving the public's opinion of the legal profession.
No single reform can likely instill in lawyers a routine
practice of assessing how their actions impact third parties and
how to include the interests of third parties in the framework
they use to assess difficult ethical situations. Instead, a variety
of reforms would probably be required to create such a cultural
shift. This article suggests two areas of reform for consideration:
the Model Rules and legal education.
The Model Rules and its predecessors, the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics and the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, articulate a need for lawyers to comply with the
rule of law during their representation of clients, as well as in
their personal affairs.9 Each of these guidelines clearly
prohibited the violation of the criminal laws that many of the
lawyers involved in Watergate committed.o The Model Rules
and its predecessors also all contain provisions that expressly or
implicitly are concerned with the rights of third parties in some
specific situations, such as a lawyer's duty not to make false
statements of material fact to third parties.11 However, neither
the Model Rules nor its predecessors contain a broad principle
that a lawyer's ethical decision-making framework should be
informed, at least in part, by the impact of the lawyer's conduct
on the interests of third parties. Such a principle could be
included in the Model Rules, probably not as a standard for
disciplinary enforcement, but as a general guiding principle such
as those set forth in the Preamble.
Next, legal education can help future lawyers develop an
analytical framework to consider ethical dilemmas, in part,
9 Infra Part II.B-D.
lo Infra Part II.B-D.
11 Infra Part II.B-D.
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through the perspective of third parties. Increasingly, legal
ethics education has used a problem-based pedagogy to put
ethical dilemmas in context and to give students the opportunity
to assess problems from different roles, such as lawyer, client,
third-party neutral and judge.12 Such roles could also include
third parties impacted by lawyers' conduct, which could broaden
the perspective through which ethical problems are viewed and
analyzed. Additionally, legal ethics education may benefit from
the growing dialogue about developing the emotional intelligence
of law students and lawyers. Emotional intelligence includes
developing empathy for others and an understanding of their
perspective, which could be valuable to legal ethics education. 13
Legal education can also help train lawyers to do a better job
of educating their clients about the role of lawyers and the limits
on their role. The conduct of the actors involved in Watergate
has, in many instances, been explained by the context in which
the actors were placed-specifically the White House and all of
its power and prestige.14 There is undoubtedly some truth to
that explanation, but it would be an overstatement to say that
the motivations of the actors were unique to that powerful
setting. In today's competitive business world, private attorneys
must compete vigorously to retain their clients' business or risk
losing income and frequently job security. This can create
incredible pressure to satisfy the demands of clients, who are not
bound by the professional rules of ethics and frequently are not
even interested in hearing about them.15 Thus, lawyers need to
do a better job of communicating with their clients about the
limits of their role. No matter which lawyer a client sees, that
client should hear a clear and consistent message that the lawyer
is not there to win at all costs, but to advocate for the client
within the parameters of the facts and the law, while treating
third parties with dignity and respect.
Part I of this article gives a brief overview of Watergate and
focuses on the specific conduct of some of the lawyers who were
disciplined. Part II of this article gives an overview of the history
the American Bar Association's efforts to codify ethical rules
including the promulgation of the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Part III will discuss post-Watergate
events involving lawyers that have impaired the public's trust of
the profession, which suggest there is still room for improvement.
Lastly, Part IV will discuss possible reforms to the Model Rules
12 Infra Part IV.B.
13 Infra Part IV.B.
14 Infra Part III.
15 Infra Part III.
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and legal education that could help instill in lawyers a principle
of evaluating the impact of their conduct on third parties as a
routine part of legal practice and ethical decision-making.
I. WATERGATE
A. A General Overview
While the events that comprise what is now referred to
collectively as "Watergate" are extensive, this article will only
briefly outline some of the events to provide context for a more
detailed exploration of the actions of some of the individual
lawyers involved in Watergate. The epicenter of Watergate
occurred on June 17, 1972, when five men were arrested at the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices located in the
Watergate Hotel.16 This break-in was part of a broader campaign
strategy devised by Nixon and his aides aimed at attacking
Nixon's Democratic opponent in the 1972 campaign.17 This
strategy included bugging the offices of the DNC in order to
obtain political intelligence.18
The men arrested on June 17, 1972, were James McCord,
who was working for the Committee to Re-elect the President
(CRP)19 and four Cubans. 20 Those involved in planning and
authorizing the break-in included Gordon Liddy (a lawyer), Jeb
Magruder, and John Mitchell, the former U.S. Attorney General
who had left that post to work for CRP and take over the
management of Nixon's re-election campaign.21 The break-in
occurred just months before Nixon won the 1972 election by a
landslide for a second term. 22  The events that collectively
comprise "Watergate," however, span the years before and after
the break-in.
In many ways, the story of Watergate began in 1971, when
the New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, a
top-secret study regarding the Vietnam War, which Daniel
Ellsberg had leaked to the press.23 Responding to this leak, the
White House formed the "Plumbers," a group tasked with
16 Tad Szulc, Democratic Raid Tied to Realtor, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1972, at 1; SAM
J. ERVIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 7 (1980).
17 ERVIN, supra note 16, at 3-4.
is Id. at 5.
19 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 61-62.
20 ERVIN, supra note 16, at 7-8.
21 Id. at 4, 40.
22 Id. at 10 ("President Nixon was returned to the White House over his Democratic
opponent, Senator George S. McGovern, by a landslide victory in which he received 520 of
the nation's 538 electoral votes and 60.8 percent of its popular votes.").
23 Id. at 120.
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plugging information leaks.24 Members of the "Plumbers"
included Egil "Bud" Krogh (a lawyer), G. Gordon Liddy (a lawyer)
and Howard Hunt, a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency.25
The "Plumbers" sought to discredit Daniel Ellsberg's
character and mental stability, which was the motivation behind
a burglary of the offices of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.26
Members of the "Plumbers," including Krogh authorized the
burglary, which was carried out by a team that included Liddy,
Hunt and four Cubans.27 It was these same four Cubans who,
along with James McCord, (McCord was working for CRP),
subsequently broke into the DNC offices at Watergate. 28 This
fact, in large part, appears to have motivated Nixon and the
White House's cover-up of the Watergate break-in.29 While direct
ties between CRP's Watergate break-in and the White House
were weak, the ties between the White House and the break-in of
Dr. Fielding's office were stronger; this made the President
vulnerable to being implicated in wrongdoing.30 Because four of
the men involved in the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office were
taken into custody and faced criminal charges for the Watergate
break-in, the President's administration apparently perceived a
threat that those men would disclose information about the
break-in of Dr. Fielding's office and the role of the White House,
as part of a plea bargain.31 And thus, the Watergate cover-up
began.
Concerns about additional leaks also caused Nixon to want
to obtain Morton Halperin's papers from the Brookings Institute
because there were reports that those papers would extend the
Pentagon Papers into the time frame of Nixon's administration.32
Breaking in and stealing the papers was not feasible because
24 Id.
25 Id. at 105-06, 120.
26 Id. at 106.
27 JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE END OF THE STORY 506-10 (2009); see
N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337 (listing lawyers who were involved in Watergate-
related activities).
2s DEAN, supra note 27, at 101-02; ERVIN, supra note 16, at 10.
29 See infra note 31.
3o Nixon never admitted to knowing about the Ellsberg break-in prior to March
1973-eighteen months after the break-in occurred. FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 210 (1994).
However his close aides were apparently never sure of this, and were concerned that he
could be implicated. See DEAN, supra note 27, at 240-41, 314-16.
31 DEAN, supra note 27, at 101-06.
32 Id. at 43. "Although the Pentagon Papers did not deal directly with the Nixon
administration, the president believed that publishing the papers would undermine his
efforts to control Vietnam policy." MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE WATERGATE CRISIS 15
(1999).
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they were believed to be in a very secure vault inside the
building.33 Nixon's Special Counsel, Chuck Colson (a lawyer),34
proposed a plan to firebomb the Brookings Institute to create
chaos and provide an opportunity to gain access to the facility.35
This plan was abandoned after White House Counsel John Dean
raised an objection to it.36 While Dean's intervention stopped
this plan, instead of viewing Dean's objections as wise counsel,
some of the President's inner circle viewed him as having some
"little old lady" in him. 37 In other words, those in power seemed
to send a message that the people ready and willing to do the
President's bidding should not feel constrained by the law.
The combination of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins set
the stage for the events after the Watergate break-in, when the
White House and many individuals associated with it engaged in
cover-up activitieS38 that would result in a multitude of criminal
charges.39 These events, and others, arose in an environment in
which the White House and the presidency were in many
instances viewed as infallible and above the law.40 There seems
to have been a general attitude that began with Nixon that the
ends sought by the White House justified any means. For
example, with respect to the documents Nixon wanted from the
Brookings Institute, tapes of Nixon reveal demands from him
such as, "Goddamnit, get in [the Brookings Institute] and get
those files. Blow the safe and get it," and "You're to break into
the place, rifle the files, and bring them in."41 In 1975 Dean
Weckstein wrote about this attitude among the Watergate actors:
There is a difference in application, but not in underlying principle,
between those who would state that it is a lawyer's duty to use any
means (legal or illegal; honest or dishonest) to get his client off or
otherwise achieve a victory and those who would break into a
33 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43.
34 See infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text.
35 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43.
36 Id. at 43-46.
37 Id. at 46.
38 Id. at 532-36. John Dean wrote:
Bud Krogh's explanation as to why the cover-up occurred-that the
Ellsberg-related burglary was at the core of the cover-up-is correct, at least
as far as the White House was concerned. This fact was well understood by
all who were involved in the cover-up, although it has been left to only Bud
and myself to acknowledge it, since Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell
went to their graves either pretending they did not understand why the
cover-up occurred or denied that anything untoward had, in fact, happened.
Id. at 529.
39 Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Watergate: The Public Lawyer and The Bar as seen from the
Perspective of the ABA Ethics Committee, 30 BUS. LAW. 295, 296 (1975).
40 See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
41 DEAN, supra note 27, at 32-33; STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW
NIXON TAPES 3, 6 (1997).
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psychiatrist's office or engage in illegal wiretapping in the name of
national security or to get their candidate elected and save the world
from George McGovern.42
B. Lawyers' Crimes and Discipline
The criminal offenses of some of the lawyers involved in
Watergate included "ordering, acquiescing in, participating in, or
helping to cover up burglaries and thefts; illegal wiretapping;
obstruction of justice; perjury; violations of campaign
contribution laws; [and] giving and accepting bribes."43 Most Of
these lawyers were not acting in their capacity as a lawyer when
they engaged in misconduct.44 This did not, however, prevent
them from being subject to discipline by the states and courts in
which they were admitted to practice.45 Nor did that fact prevent
damage to the reputation of lawyers and their role in the
administration of justice.46
John Dean, former White House Counsel, famously testified
before the Senate Watergate Committee in 1973 about a list he
had made of all the people that he thought had violated the law.47
He had put an asterisk next to ten of the names on the list, each
of whom was a lawyer.48 Senator Talmadge questioned Dean
about the significance of the marks and Dean responded, "[T]hat
was just a reaction to myself, the fact that how in God's name
could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?"49
Dean's list turned out to be modest.
The National Organization of Bar Counsel created a Special
Committee on the Co-ordination of Watergate Discipline in
1973.50 The committee issued its final report in 1976 and
reported that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against
twenty-nine lawyers in connection with Watergate-related
matters.51  The report disclosed that seven of the lawyers
involved had been disbarred (President Nixon among them),
public disciplinary action had been taken against another eleven
42 Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261,
270 (1975). He also wrote, "We must encourage our law students to accept the priority of
process over results and means over ends . . . ." Id.
43 Tondel, supra note 39, at 296.
44 See Stuart E. Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Lawyer Been
Diminished?, 79 CoMM. L.J. 73, 74 (1974).
45 See Clark, infra note 50.
46 See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 42, at 271; Hertzberg, supra note 44, at 74.
47 John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 609, 611 (2000).
48 Id.
49 Id.
so N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337; see also Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of
Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 678-79 (2000).
51 N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337.
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other lawyers, and as of 1976 no public disciplinary action had
been reported against the remaining eleven lawyers.52
While many of the actions of the disciplined lawyers involved
violations of the law that were more injurious to society as a
whole, many of the violations of the law also directly infringed on
the rights and interests of individuals. For example, in the
opinion that disbarred Nixon from the New York Bar, the Court's
description of Nixon's misconduct included conduct that directly
violated the rights of Dr. Fielding, who had his office broken into,
and Daniel Ellsberg, whose personal legal defense was
obstructed:
Mr. Nixon improperly. . . attempted to obstruct an investigation by
the United States Department of Justice of an unlawful entry into the
offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a psychiatrist who had treated Daniel
Ellsberg; improperly concealed and encouraged others to conceal
evidence relating to unlawful activities of members of his staff and of
the Committee to Re-elect the President; and improperly engaged in
conduct which he knew or should have known would interfere with
the legal defense of Daniel Ellsberg.53
Egil "Bud" Krogh, the Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs
to the President of the United States and later Undersecretary of
Transportation, was also disbarred.54 Krogh recalled a meeting
where President Nixon's Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, and Chief
Domestic Advisor, John Ehrlichman, told Krogh, "[Y]ou have one
client. And that client is Richard Nixon."55 Krogh has since
reflected, "The choice of words was deliberate. Our client was a
person, not the President or the presidency. And we were to
serve his wishes as zealously as we could."56
As a member of the White House "Plumbers," Krogh was
instructed that the President wanted him to investigate the leak
of the Pentagon Papers with the "utmost zeal," and to utilize
whatever means the government had at its disposal to stop leaks
of information that the President considered a matter of national
security.57 This led to Krogh's involvement in adopting a plan
whereby Howard Hunt, another member of the "Plumbers,"
would break into the office of Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, in an effort to steal records that could depict
Ellsberg as someone who was unreliable and untrustworthy. 58
52 Id.; see also Clark, supra note 50, at 678-79.
53 In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 179-80 (N.Y. App. 1976).
54 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 589-90 (Wash. 1975).
55 Lynne Reaves, Ethics in Action: Two Recall Watergate Lessons, 70 A.B.A. J. 35, 35
(1984).
56 Id.
57 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 579-80.
58 Id. at 580.
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The Supreme Court of Washington's opinion that disbarred
Krogh focused on his guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241
(conspiracy against the rights of citizens), which was a felony.59
The charges against Krogh included specific violations of Dr.
Fielding's rights:
[T]hat while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United
States Government, [he] ... unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did
combine, conspire, confederate and agree with his co-conspirators to
injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a
citizen of the United States, in the free exercise and enjoyment of a
right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and to conceal such activities. It further charged that
the co-conspirators did, without legal process, probable cause, search
warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding in
Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine
and photograph documents and records containing confidential
information concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress,
threaten and intimidate Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and
enjoyment of the right and privilege secured to him by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be secure in
his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures .... To all of these allegations, the respondent had
pleaded guilty. 60
As otherwise stated by the court, Krogh not only flagrantly
disregarded the laws of the United States, but also the
fundamental rights of citizens.61
The court's opinion indicated that perhaps the environment
in which Krogh was functioning helped lead him astray:
[Krogh] indicated that he had been blinded, perhaps, by the power of
the Presidency or what he conceived to be its power. A number of men
who submitted letters attesting to his good character expressed the
concern that they in the same circumstances might have behaved in
much the same manner.62
59 Id. at 578.
60 Id. at 579. The opinion states that Krogh became distressed when he learned that
the burglars had left evidence of their break-in "not, it appears, because of concern of Dr.
Fielding's property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary
might lead to a discovery of the identity of the perpetrators." Id. at 580.
61 Id. at 584.
62 Id. at 583; see also D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(order suspending former Attorney General of the United States Richard Kleindienst from
the practice of law for thirty days and stating "that respondent is a man of high
professional stature, with correspondingly high obligations, who was caught up in a
'highly charged political atmosphere . . . when pressed by political opponents'."); In the
Matter of Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (order suspending attorney Claude
Wild from the practice of law for one year acknowledged that Wild had been pressured by
the Nixon administration to make illegal campaign contributions on behalf of his
employer, Gulf Oil, and that he feared reprisals to his employer if he did not make the
donation). Sam Dash, the chief counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee also wrote
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Krogh seems to have given little thought to the impact of his
conduct on others at the time of his actions; he was focused on his
and his superior's interests.63
Krogh's reasoning for pleading guilty to the criminal charges
suggests a later-developed appreciation of his violations of the
rights of third parties. Krogh explained:
I had a chance to sit back and sort of look at where I was. I was under
indictment in both California and Washington and yet I was a person
that was at large, free to travel, free to associate with whomever I
wished. I could say what I wanted to and if I said it to certain
individuals it would get reported. I could attend any church of my
choice. There were a number of things I was enjoying as a defendant,
potential defendant in a criminal trial and yet here I was defending
conduct when I was a government servant which had stripped another
individual of his Fourth Amendment rights to be secure from an
illegal search, and I suppose it was that I felt that if I had continued
to defend that, I would in a sense be attacking the very rights which I
was enjoying at that time as a potential defendant. 64
Charles Colson, White House Aide and Special Counsel to
President Nixon, was also disbarred following his conviction for
obstruction of justice.65 The charges to which Colson Pled guilty
included impeding and obstructing justice in connection with the
criminal trial of Daniel Ellsberg by "devising and implementing a
scheme to defame and destroy the public image and credibility of
Daniel Ellsberg and those engaged in the legal defense of Daniel
Ellsberg, with the intent to influence, obstruct and impede the
conduct and outcome of the criminal prosecution . . . ."66 These
activities were done at the behest of President Nixon who was
angered by the release of the Pentagon Papers and had
instructed Colson to stop the leaks of sensitive information "no
matter what the cost," including disseminating material to the
about the tension between a lawyer's obligation to do the right thing and a client's
expectations of a lawyer. With respect to teaching legal ethics he wrote:
It's nice to talk about these things theoretically in law school. But in the real
world the choice a lawyer sometimes has to make is to stand up to a client who
wants to do something wrong and say no. And by standing up to him you may
lose your job.
Reaves, supra note 55, at 35.
63 The opinion disbarring Krogh states that he became distressed when he learned
that the burglars had left evidence of their break-in "not, it appears, because of concern of
Dr. Fielding's property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary
might lead to a discovery of the identity of the perpetrators." In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 580.
64 Id. at 581.
65 In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
66 Id. at 1162-63. Some of the specific acts included releasing defamatory allegations
about one of Ellsberg's attorneys and attempting to obtain and release derogatory
information about Daniel Ellsberg, including his psychiatric files. Id. at 1163.
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news media that would "expose" Ellsberg and his motives.67
There is, of course, a societal interest in the integrity of criminal
proceedings; but in addition, Daniel Ellsberg and his counsel also
had an individual interest that was infringed by this conduct-
namely the right to be free from lawyers falsely attacking their
public image and reputation through illicit means.
Another actor in Watergate, attorney Donald Segretti, was
hired by two members of Nixon's staff, Dwight Chapin and
Gordon Strachan, to pull pranks on Democratic presidential
aspirants in order to cause internal divisions and prevent the
party from uniting around one candidate.68 In short, "[Segrettil
repeatedly committed acts of deceit designed to subvert the free
electoral process."69 As a result of these activities, Donald
Searetti was convicted of violating campaign laws.70 He was
subsequently suspended from the practice of law for two years as
a result of those convictions.71
Segretti's "pranks" certainly subverted society's interest in
an honest election process, but his activities also invaded the
interests of specific individuals. For example, Segretti wrote and
distributed a letter on the Citizens for Muskie Committee
letterhead, without its consent, which falsely accused Senators
Humphrey and Jackson (both candidates for the Democratic
nomination for President) of sexual improprieties.72 Both
Senators Humphrey and Jackson had the individual right not to
have a lawyer knowingly publicize false accusations about them.
Segretti also wrote another letter on Senator Humphrey's
stationery, without his consent, falsely alleging that
Representative Shirley Chisholm, also a Democratic candidate,
had been committed to a mental institution and was still under
psychiatric care. 73 Senator Humphrey had the right not to have
his identity misappropriated, and Representative Chisholm had
the right not to have false accusations knowingly made about her
mental capacities. Perhaps Segretti recognized this when he
testified before the Senate Watergate Committee, "To the extent
67 Id.
68 In re Segretti, 544 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1976).
69 Id. at 934.
70 Id. at 930. Specifically, Segretti was convicted of violating federal law prohibiting
the publication or distribution of statements relating to presidential candidates without
disclosing the names of the persons or organizations responsible for the publication or
distribution, as well as conspiracy to commit such acts. Id.
71 Id. at 936.




the activities have harmed other persons and the political
process, I have the deepest regret."74
The California Supreme Court not only suspended Segretti
from the practice of law, it also ordered that he (and all future
suspended members of the bar) pass the then newly instituted
Professional Responsibility Examination as a condition of
reinstatement.75 The court wrote, "In short, although we cannot
insure that any attorney will in fact behave ethically, we can at
least be certain that he is fully aware of what his ethical duties
are."76
In the early to mid-1970s, as the events of Watergate were
still unfolding, some members of the legal profession made
comments that expressed concern about the Watergate
participants' disregard for the rights and dignity of third parties.
For example, in 1973 ABA President Robert Meserve spoke to the
ABA about Watergate and quoted the late John Lord O'Brian
who wrote, "The whole American way of life, to say nothing of the
confidence of the citizens in the government, is based, as we all
know, upon a belief in the dignity of the individual accompanied
by a pervasive sense of intelligent toleration and respect for the
rights of the others."77
Meserve observed that perhaps "the belief in individual
dignity and the deliberate promotion of mutual respect and
tolerance" had suffered the most damage from Watergate.78
Attorney Elliot L. Richardson, who gave an address at the
ABA's 1974 annual convention, had some similar reflections on
the cause of Watergate and the continued presence of the cause:
The problem is that the forces underlying Watergate morality persist.
And very important among these forces, although not sufficiently
appreciated as such, is the decline of a sense of community . . .. Those
who lack a sense of community become prone to a rootless kind of
amorality that makes them easily influenced by the institutional
value systems to which they happen for the time being to belong.79
74 Id. at 934 n.5. Other disciplinary actions included the disbarment of John
Mitchell, former Attorney General of the United States, after his conviction for
conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of justice, In re Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743, 744-45
(N.Y. 1976), and the disbarment of Gordon Liddy following his conviction for several
crimes, including burglary in the second degree. In re Liddy, 343 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973).
75 In re Segretti, 544 P.2d at 936-37.
76 Id. at 936.
77 Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and Watergate, 59 A.B.A. J. 985, 986
(1973).
78 Id.




Richardson went on to state that such rootlessness may lead
to the "sustained pursuit of self-interest," and that such
"[elxcessive absorption in self-interest leads, in turn, to
individualism unconstrained by respect for other individuals."80
Richardson further stated, "Indeed, where there is true respect
for other people-the awareness that each is a unique, sacrosanct
individual equal in dignity to every other human being-there is
awareness of obligation which is higher and more sensitive than
any requirement of the law."81
Richardson's address is somewhat reminiscent of Justice
Brandeis' comments in a 1933 speech where he opined that the
reason that lawyers do not hold a high position with the people is
not because of a lack of opportunity, but because "[iInstead of
holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the
people, prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers
have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adiuncts of
great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their
powers for the protection of the people."82
II. POST-WATERGATE LEGAL REFORMS
At the time of Watergate, the ABA's 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code") was the national model of
ethical rules that influenced the codes of conduct adopted by the
various states. The ABA revisited the Code in 1977, when it
formed the Commission on the Evaluation of Professional
standards, known as the Kutak Commission, to recommend
changes to the Code.83 The result was the ABA's adoption of the
1983 Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"), which remains the
predominant guide for the states today. However, in order to
examine the evolution of ethical rules and their perception of the
role of the lawyer in society, it will be helpful to start our review
of ethical guidelines in the mid-1800s. The perception of the
lawyer's role has slightly shifted over time from one who is a
member of the community, charged with maintaining
independence and keeping an eye on justice, to one who is more
of a partisan advocate who has less independence from the
directives of his or her client.84 This shift may underlie part of
the cause of Watergate, and it still persists today.
8o Id.
81 Id. at 271.
82 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 337 (1933).
83 ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v (1987) [hereinafter
ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES].
84 Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics-II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 220-22 (2002).
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A. Ethics Before the ABA's Involvement
Before the ABA drafted the Canons of Professional Ethics in
1908, there were several early statements of ethics that
influenced the development of the ABA's 1908 Canons. First,
David Hoffman's 1846 book A Course of Legal Study contains one
of the earliest American statements of lawyers' ethics in a section
titled "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment"
("Resolutions").85 The Resolutions contemplated the lawyer's role
as a moral agent of justice as being paramount to the lawyer's
role as a zealous advocate under the law. Otherwise stated,
Hoffman believed that moral law, which he understood to have a
religious foundation, took priority over positive law.86 For
example, the Resolutions provided the following with respect to
the representation of a defendant who the lawyer knows has
committed a crime:
Persons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and
man, are entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our
pure and honourable profession; and, indeed, to no intervention
beyond securing them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the
facts of their cause, and the due application of the law: all that goes
beyond this, either in manner or substance, is unprofessional, and
proceeds, either from a mistaken view of the relation of client and
counsel, or from some unworthy and selfish motive, which sets a
higher value on professional display and success, than on truth and
justice, and the substantial interests of the community.87
Other Resolutions regarding civil matters contained similar
principles. For example, the Resolutions admonished a lawyer
never to plead the statute of limitations if that was the only
defense available and the client was conscious of owing a debt.88
Similarly, the Resolutions stated that lawyers "will never plead,
or otherwise avail of the bar of Infancy, against an honest
demand" if the client has the ability to pay and has no other
defense.89 They also stated that even if the law provided for such
a defense, the lawyer should independently judge whether its use
was proper under the circumstances.90 One writer described
Hoffman's moral philosophy as follows, "He maintains that
85 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 752-75 (1846). Hoffman drafted this book to be the curriculum at
his planned law school at the University of Maryland. James M. Altman, Considering the
A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2422 (2003).
86 Altman, supra note 85, at 2423. Hoffman's resolutions included: "What is morally
wrong, cannot be professionally right. . . ." HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 765.
87 HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 756.
88 Id. at 754.




attorneys must independently consult their consciences when
conducting their cases and should not press claims that would
make bad law. Hoffman's moral system, then, is explicitly
premised on the assumption that men's consciences will
accurately reflect shared community norms."91
The next influential statement of lawyers' ethical duties was
George Sharswood's "An Essay on Professional Ethics," which
was published in 1884 and then reprinted in 1907.92 Sharswood
also emphasized the importance of a lawyer's conscience in the
course of his professional work, but his approach has been
described as more nuanced than Hoffman's.93 With respect to
defendants, Sharswood believed that the value of lawyers in the
adversary system provided sufficient justification for a lawyer to
represent a client who the lawyer believed had committed a
wrong.94 However, his view was more akin to Hoffman's when it
came to representing a plaintiff in a civil case. In that situation,
Sharswood wrote that a lawyer has "an undoubted right, and [is]
in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned for a plaintiff in the
pursuit of a demand, which offends his sense of what is just and
right."95 Sharswood also wrote that, other than the ministry,
there was no profession other than the law where a "high-toned
morality" was imperative; indeed "[h]igh moral principle is [the
lawyer's] only safe guide; the only torch to light his way amidst
darkness and obstruction."96
Lastly, the first code of ethics formally adopted in the
country was the Alabama State Bar Association's Code
("Alabama Code"), adopted in 1887.97 The Alabama Code also
contemplated that a lawyer's role as an advocate would be
91 Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama
State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 494 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
92 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993).
93 Altman, supra note 85, at 2427-29.
Because Sharswood emphasizes, much more than Hoffman, the importance of
the adversary process to the administration of justice and acknowledges, to a
much greater extent, that the lawyer's professional role is shaped by that
process, Sharswood's view of the lawyer's duty 'when the legal demands or
interests of his client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right' is
much more nuanced than Hoffman's.
Id. at 2427.
94 Id. at 2428-29.
95 Id.
96 SHARSWOOD, supra note 92, at 55. Sharswood also wrote, "The client has no right
to require [the lawyer] to be illiberal-and he should throw up his brief sooner than do
what revolts against his own sense of what is demanded by honor and propriety." Id. at
74-75. Sharswood also acknowledges that there are not necessarily easy answers when
the legal demands and interests of the client conflict with the lawyer's own sense of what
is just and right. Id. at 81.
97 Altman, supra note 85, at 2437.
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subordinate to his own moral views and to his obligations to third
parties:
[A]ccording to the Alabama Code, the lawyer's duty of zealous
representation is subject to the lawyer's greater obligations to (i) the
legal system, i.e. 'obedience to law'; (ii) third parties; i.e. 'the obligation
to his neighbor'; and (iii) his own moral view of right and wrong or, in
other words, what was just and unjust in the eyes of his God; i.e.
'accountability to the Creator.'9 8
The Alabama Code heavily influenced the ABA's Canons of
Professional Ethics, with some provisions of the Canons being
derived primarily from the language in the Alabama Code.99
B. The Evolution of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct
Since its formation, the American Bar Association has
adopted three major iterations of ethical guidelines for lawyers in
the United States-the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Each document gives some
consideration of the role of morality in lawyering, although the
emphasis on the lawyer's role as a moral actor arguably
decreases with each version. Each document has also contained
language regarding the need for lawyers to operate within the
bounds of the law in order to uphold the public's respect for the
law and the legal profession, which are important rationales.
None of these documents, however, explicitly state that
upholding the rule of law frequently serves another broad
purpose-it prevents a lawyer from becoming an instrument in
the violation of the rights of third parties.
While all of the documents contain some sections that give
parameters about lawyers' treatment of third parties in certain
circumstances, none of them specifically set out third parties as
an important beneficiary of adherence to the rule of law or as a
specific consideration that should inform a lawyer's ethical
decision-making regarding his or her actions. This is not to
suggest that a lawyer's loyalty to his or her client is not going to
trump consideration of a third party's rights at times; indeed,
sometimes the proper role of a lawyer will demand that outcome.
That reality, however, should not preclude a lawyer from
thinking through the implications of his or her conduct regarding
the rights of third parties and, perhaps through that lens, some
misconduct could be averted. Furthermore, even when a lawyer
98 Id. at 2448 (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 2453.
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concludes that the law properly demands action of him or her
that will harm the interests of third parties, this reflection may
allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the law
allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible
course of action. At other times, the lawyer may conclude that
the law demands action of him or her that will harm the rights of
the third parties, but these moments may allow for important
reflection on whether the law as written has struck the right
balance between advocacy and interests in justice.100 Working to
reform and improve the law is also within the proper role of all
lawyers.101
C. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
In 1908 the ABA promulgated the Canons of Professional
Ethics ("Canons").102 The Canons are believed to be, at least in
part, a response to President Theodore Roosevelt's criticism of
the legal profession, particularly corporate lawyer.103 In 1905
President Roosevelt gave a speech at Harvard where he made the
following statements about the legal profession:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical
contempt for those prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he
can escape or evade is a menace to our community; and the
community is not to be excused if it does not develop a spirit which
actively frowns on and discountenances him. The great profession of
the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the
lead in the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as things
actually are, many of the most influential and most highly
remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth make it
their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which
their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws
which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of
great wealth.10 4
Hoffman's Resolutions, Sharswood's essay on ethics, and the
Alabama State Bar Association's 1887 Code all had some
influence on the drafters of the Canons.105 There is also support
1oo See infra Part IV.A.
101 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 6 (2009) ("As a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration
of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.").
102 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
103 Altman, supra note 85, at 2403.
104 President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Harvard University (June 28, 1905),
available at http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/143.txt. One
scholar has suggested that the ABA's formation of the 1908 Code of Professional Ethics
stemmed from this speech. Altman, supra note 85, at 2409.
105 Altman, supra note 85, at 2400; see also David 0. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff,
Were the Watergate Lawyers an Exception?, 3 B. LEADER 17, 17 (1978).
128 [Vol. 16:1
Post- Watergate
for the view that, by the late 1800s, lawyers were viewing their
responsibilities to their clients as their primary, and perhaps
exclusive, moral obligation and the Canons were drafted to try to
counter that trend.106 While heavily influenced by the Alabama
Code, one writer has argued that the Canons "express a more
robust vision of conscientious lawyering that enlarges the
authority of, and gives greater support to, the lawyer's moral
autonomy in the relationship."107 The Canons "prescribed a
vision of conscientious lawyering" where "a special obligation for
achieving moral and legal justice" limited zealous advocacy.108
The Preamble to the Canons underscored the need for the
public's faith in the legal profession: "The future of the Republic,
to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure
and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct
and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to
merit the approval of all just men."109 Believing that no set of
rules could be codified to govern the behavior of lawyers, the
Canons adopted broad ethical principles to provide general
guidelines.110
The Canons contained principles that cautioned lawyers to
limit their zealous advocacy by adherence to the rule of law. For
example, the Canons expressly stated that the rule of law
constrained a lawyer's obligation to zealously advocate for his
client and recognized the damage to the profession's reputation
when the public viewed lawyers as not being bound by the law:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or foster popular prejudice
against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper
discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in
winning his client's cause . ... The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.111
Canon 32 further advised that the lawyer
to Altman, supra note 85, at 2447.
107 Id. at 2441.
los Id. at 2401.




111 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (emphasis added). In this same spirit,
the Canons also stated that no client was entitled to receive "any service or advice
involving disloyalty to the law ..... CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908).
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advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon
the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client to
observe the statute law .... 112
This drafting appears to place primary consideration on moral
law and secondary consideration on positive law. It may also
have been the drafter's most direct response to President
Roosevelt's concerns. 113 Many of the drafters shared his concerns
about the increased commercialization of the legal profession "as
a general threat to the moral autonomy of the lawyer in the
attorney-client relationship."14
The Canons did recognize that in performing his duties, the
lawyer's treatment of third parties had some specific limits. For
example, the Canons made clear that clients, not lawyers, are the
litigants and that clients' animosity towards each other should
not influence a lawyer's treatment of opposing counsel or
parties.115 Canon 18 stated,
A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with
fairness and due consideration . ... The client cannot be made the
keeper of the lawyer's conscience in professional matters. He has no
right to demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or
indulge in offensive personalities. 116
Similarly, Canon 30 admonished a lawyer to "decline to
conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that it
is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to
work oppression or wrong."117
The Canons also acknowledged one particular circumstance
where the rights of third parties would trump a lawyer's fidelity
to his or her client. Canon 37 provided that "The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make
such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or
protect those against whom it is threatened," although he is not
112 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908) (emphasis added).
113 Altman, supra note 85, at 2461.
114 Id. at 2475. Altman's article concludes, "[T]o lawyers in the twenty-first century,
for whom norms of lawyer conduct have become 'legalized,' [the Canons] may seem overly
ambitious. But to members of the Canons Committee, a normative statement regarding
lawyer conduct implied something imbued with morality and, in at least some members'
minds, religion as well." Id. at 2499.
115 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 17 (1908) ("Whatever may be the ill-feeling
existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the cause. All personalities between
lawyers should be scrupulously avoided.").
nie CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 18 (1908).
117 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 30 (1908).
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compelled to do so.11s Implicit in this Canon is an
acknowledgment that there are times when the rights of a third
party may trump a lawyer's duty to his or her client.
While the Canons articulated specific limits on advocacy that
take into consideration the rights of third parties, the Canons did
not explicitly set out the rights of third parties as an important
corollary to respect for the rule of law or as an important broad
framework through which a lawyer should consider the
consequences of his or her actions when acting on behalf of a
client. In fact, the drafters of the Canons rejected a proposal to
include language similar to that found in the Alabama Code
regarding "limitations upon a lawyer's zealous representation of
his client in terms of 'man's accountability to his Creator, . . . the
duty of obedience to law and the obligation to his neighbor."119
C. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969 the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), which supplanted the Canon.120 The
structure of the Code differed from the Canons. Whereas the
Canons consisted of only ethical guidelines, the Code articulated
nine general Canons each of which was followed by ethical
considerations and specific disciplinary rules.121 The Code
explained that the Canons were statements of axiomatic norms,
the Ethical Considerations were aspirational in character, and
the Disciplinary Rules were mandatory in nature and were to
form the standards for disciplinary action as enforced by the
various states. 122 Like the Canons, the Code contained principles
regarding the rule of law's limits on a lawyer's zealous advocacy,
as well as some specific principles regarding lawyers' respect for
the rights of third parties.
The Preamble to the Code starts with some recognition of the
relationship between the rule of law and the rights of individuals,
118 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908).
119 Altman, supra note 85, at 2453 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
120 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). The Code was amended in
1970 and every year between 1974-1980. A copy of the Code with its amendments is
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/
mcpr.authcheckdam.pdf.
121 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980). The
Preface to the Code described some of the deficiencies with the Canons as follows, 'The
previous Canons were not an effective teaching instrument and failed to give guidance to
young lawyers beyond the language of the Canons themselves .... They were not cast in
language designed for disciplinary enforcement and many abounded with quaint
expressions of the past." Id. at Preface.
122 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991).
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although it does not specifically put these ideas in the context of
a lawyer's conduct:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon
recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law
grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity
through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded
makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of
the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individual
rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is
destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible. 123
The need for lawyers to respect the rule of law is also found
throughout the Code. For example, Ethical Consideration 1-5
states, "Because of his position in society, even minor violations
of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the
legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law.
To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a
platitude."124 Respect for the rule of law is also the central theme
in Canon 7 of the Code, "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."125 Similarly, Ethical
Consideration 7-19 states, "The duty of a lawyer to his client and
his duty to the legal system are the same; to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law."126
The Code also permits a lawyer, as did the Canons, to inform
a client about the moral consequences of a course of action,
although this consideration is not expressed with the same
primacy as it was in the Canons.127 Instead, the Code provides:
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations . . . . In assisting his client to reach a proper decision,
it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may
lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.
He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might
result from assertion of legally permissible positions. In the final
analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for
himself.128
Although, as one writer concluded, "In the last analysis, the
Code is not a guide to moral action. The Code, with its emphasis
on the rules, presents as the ultimate question to be answered,
123 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (emphasis added).
124 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1980).
125 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
126 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980).
127 See CANONS, supra note 109.
128 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (emphasis added).
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'How do I stay out of trouble?' rather than 'How do I make the
moral choice?"'129
Like the Canons, the Code does not contain any broad
statement that advocacy should be constrained by the interests of
third parties, but it did include specific provisions that related to
a lawyer's obligation to respect the rights of third parties in some
instances. For example, Ethical Consideration 2-30 warns
lawyers not to accept employment when "the person seeking to
employ him desires to institute or maintain an action merely for
the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another."130
Also, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 permitted, but like the Canons did
not require, a lawyer to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime," which would in many instances impact the rights of third
parties.131 The ethical considerations in the Code further
provided:
In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which
are for his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer
should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client. However, when an action in the best interest of his client
seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to
forego such action.132
One can infer that at times an action may be unjust because
of its impact on third parties, although the Code did not explicitly
state this.
D. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
While the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Rules") were not adopted until 1983133-over a decade after
Watergate-the events of Watergate were in many ways
responsible for spurring the legal profession to revisit the Code of
Professional Responsibility.134 A group of lawyers headed by
129 Thomas G. Bost, The Lawyer as Truth-Teller: Lessons from Enron, 32 PEPP. L.
REv. 505, 514 (2004); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE
CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 79 (1994)
(describing the "amazing shrinking concept of the lawyer as an independent counselor").
130 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1980); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 (1980); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(1) (1980).
131 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980); compare with
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908).
132 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1980).
133 While the Rules were first adopted in 1983 they have been amended numerous
times. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
134 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 67-68 (discussing the impact of Watergate on
reforms in the legal profession); Robert W. Meserve, Action 1972-73-American Bar
Association, 59 A.B.A. J. 986, 990 (1973) ("[The involvement of prominent lawyers in the
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Robert Kutak, known as the Kutak Commission, worked for six
years to draft the Rules.135 Watergate also prompted the ABA to
adopt a law school accreditation requirement that compels
accredited law schools to provide students with legal ethics
instruction. 136
The structure of the Rules differed from the Code. The Code
contained canons, ethical considerations and disciplinary rules.137
The Rules, however, abandoned this tripartite structure for a
structure that contained black letter rules followed by
explanatory comments for each rule.138 Preceding the black
letter rules is a Preamble that sets out broad guidelines
regarding the lawyer's role and responsibilities. To the extent
that the Rules set out aspirational principles as found in the
ethical considerations of the Code, those principles are found in
the Preamble and in the comments to the Rules.139 A
predominate goal of the Rules, however, was to legalize the
regulation of the legal profession by adopting enforceable rules
and moving away from ethical standards that contained
unenforceable aspirations.140
While the structure differed, the Rules, like the Canons and
the Code, continued to emphasize the lawyer's respect for and
adherence to the rule of law. The Preamble to the Rules states
"[a] lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the
law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's
business and personal affairs .... A lawyer should demonstrate
respect for the legal system and for those who serve it . . . ."141
Watergate affair has heightened professional concerns about discipline.").
135 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68.
136 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century After
Watergate, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 661 (2000); Clark, supra note 50, at 673. The
Committee that drafted the ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics had actually recommended in
its 1907 report that ethics be taught in all law schools and that applicants to the bar be
examined on that topic. Altman, supra note 85, at 2420-21.
137 See Preface, supra, note 120.
138 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
supra note 83, at 3-4 (discussing the change in the format and the rationale for the
change).
139 Id. at 10 ("Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reporter of the Commission, noted
that the Preamble was intended to set forth balanced and realistic statements about a
lawyer's role and responsibilities.") Such aspirational principles can also be found in some
of the comments to the rules, which at times discuss what a lawyer "should" do. Id. at 15.
See also David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 56-57 (1995) (finding ethical aspirations in some of
the permissive rules).
140 See William H. Simon, Conceptions of Legality, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 670-71
(2000); Luban & Millemann, supra note 139, at 46-51; Hazard, supra note 122, at 1241-
42, 1253-55.
141 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 5 (2009).
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The Rules acknowledge that at times a lawyer's job will
create conflicts "between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to
the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living."142 While
"remaining an ethical person" may be read to encompass a
concern about the rights of third parties, the Rules do not
explicitly articulate that consideration as part of the web of
conflicts which a lawyer must sometimes confront.143 This
section states that sometimes the Rules will provide a direct
answer to the conflict, but sometimes they will not, and the
lawyer must be guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules.144 The Rules further state that "[t]hese principles include
the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward
all persons involved in the legal system."145 While third parties
certainly have an interest in courteous and civil treatment, a
clear principle affirming respect for the rights of third parties
would include a broader articulation of their interests.
Like the Code, the Rules continue to contemplate that a
lawyer's advice may include moral factors, although the moral
independence of the attorney is not stressed as it was in the
Canons.146 Rule 2.1 states that: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional iudgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, which may be relevant to the client's
situation."147 The comments to Rule 2.1 suggest that moral
factors could include the impact on third parties:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client,
especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on
other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice,
therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.
Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively
influence how the law will be applied. 148
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 9 (2009).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. Respect for the rule of law is also embodied in other provisions of the Rules
that are analogous to provisions in the Canons and the Code. For example, Rule 1.2(d)
prohibits a lawyer from counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client in conduct that
is criminal or fraudulent. Id. at R. 1.2(d).
146 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009).
147 Id.
148 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2011) (emphasis added); see also
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Other provisions of the Rules also have an underlying
concern for some rights of third parties. For example, Rule 3.4
prohibits a variety of activities that are deemed to be unfair to
opposing parties and their counsel, such as unlawfully
obstructing their access to evidence or falsifying evidence.149 Rule
3.8 compels prosecutors to ensure that the accused have been
advised of their right to obtain counsel and to be given the
opportunity to do so. 150 Also, Rule 4.1 prohibits lawyers from
making a false statement of material fact to any third parties
during the course of their representation of clients.151
Significant changes in the Model Rules that resulted from
Watergate included the confidentiality rules in Rule 1.6, which
are implicitly driven by concern for the rights of third parties.152
Rule 1.6 defined a lawyer's duty of confidentiality more broadly
than did the Code.153 As the Kutak Commission originally
proposed, however, Rule 1.6 permitted a lawyer to reveal a
client's confidences in several situations that would benefit third
parties, including
to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another; [and] to rectify the consequences of a
client's criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which the lawyer's
services had been used. 15 4
These exceptions in initial drafts, however, immediately
became a subject of debate and amendment. "The debate focused
on the problem of balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of
Russell Pearce, How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And the Answer is not
Pro Bono), 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 216 (proposing a new Model Rule that would
restore lawyers' morally accountability); Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From
Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85, 126-30 (2010) (arguing that
Rule 2.1 has been fairly dormant and that states should make its practical application
more robust).
149 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009).
150 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2009).
151 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009).
152 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68. Model Rule 1.13, which addressed a
lawyer's duties when representing an organization, was another significant development
post-Watergate. Id. The initial version of Rule 1.13 the ABA adopted was disappointing to
many critics of the legal profession who had hoped for more radical reform after
Watergate. Id. at 70. After Enron, those rules were revisited and amended again. Id. at
85.
153 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
supra note 83, at 48; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 71.
154 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
supra note 83, at 48. There was also an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose
confidences to establish a claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal
representation. Id.
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lawyer, client and the public."155 Proponents argued that the
proposed rule struck the right balance between a client's right to
have confidences protected and the public's right to be protected
from criminal acts. 156 Opponents, however, argued successfully
that the exceptions were too broad and inhibited lawyer-client
communication.157 Thus, Rule 1.6, as adopted, contained limited
exceptions that permitted a lawyer to reveal confidential
information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm."158 This was a narrower exception than
the one in the Code, which permitted a lawyer to reveal the
"intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime."159
Rule 1.6, as adopted in 1983, was a disappointment to many
lawyers who had hoped for more radical reform after
Watergate.160 The majority of states declined to adopt the rule as
adopted by the House of Delegates.161 There were two
subsequent efforts to amend Rule 1.6 to contain provisions
similar to those proposed by the Kutak Commission, but both of
them failed.162 It was not until 2003 that Rule 1.6 was amended
to allow a lawyer to reveal confidences in situations originally
contemplated by the Kutak Commission.163 Since that
amendment, Rule 1.6 now provides, in part:
b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
155 Id.
156 Id. at 48-49.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 51. There also remained an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose
confidences to establish a claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal
representation. Id. See id. at 51 for a red-lined version of the proposed rule as amended.
159 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(C)(3) (1969); see also Rochvarg,
supra note 4, at 71-72. The ABA also rejected the Code's prior rule that required a lawyer
to disclose a client's fraud to try to rectify that fraud and, instead, prohibited such
disclosures. Id.
16o Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 70.
161 Id. at 73.
162 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2005, at 115, 117 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. Unsuccessful efforts to amend Model Rule 1.6 were first made in 1991. Id. at
115. Another round of unsuccessful efforts occurred in 2001. Id. at 117-32. See also
Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 73.
163 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 133-41.
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interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services.164
It is not a coincidence that these amendments finally
occurred in the wake of Enron, a financial scandal that also
impacted the reputation of the legal profession. 165
III. THE LEGAL PROFESSION POST-WATERGATE
Many lawyers have correctly pointed out that the Code,
which was the national model for a code of ethics at the time of
Watergate, left no ambiguity about the impropriety of acts such
as breaking, entering, perjury and obstruction of justice.166 Many
lawyers, however, were involved in these activities despite clear
ethical guidance not to break the law.167 In 1973, ABA President
Robert W. Meserve wrote the following about Watergate:
This is much more than an ethical problem. No one needs a course in
ethics to know that burglary or perjury is illegal or immoral. What is
needed is an acceptance of a reasonable respect for law and a
recognition that no one-however high or low his rank-is above it.168
Thus, many lawyers suggested that revising the Code would
not prevent future situations like Watergate.169 Indeed, since the
adoption of the Model Rules, there have been subsequent events
involving lawyers that have once again damaged the reputation
of the legal profession to varying degrees.170
164 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009). This amendment to Model
Rule 1.6 was adopted at the ABA's Annual Meeting in 2003. ABA, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 162, at 133-34.
165 See Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 85-86.
166 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 34-35 (2002) ("Most observers found it ludicrous to suppose that the
massive misconduct among Nixon appointees and campaign contributors stemmed from
their lack of familiarity with bar codes of conduct."); Interview with Chesterfield Smith,
President, ABA, in S.F., Cal. (Feb. 25, 1974) The Bar and Watergate: Conversation with
Chesterfield Smith, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 31, 34 (1974) [hereinafter Interview]
(disregarding suggestions that the Code needed to be revised in response to Watergate
because "[blreaking and entering, lying, obstructing justice, or perjuring oneself is a
violation under any standard I've ever heard of"); Robert W. Meserve, Our Profession &
Watergate, 2 STUDENT LAw. 9, 11, 60 (1973-74) ("Surely, it does not require a close
reading of the Code of Professional Responsibility to support the proposition that
breaking and entering is wrong, that perjury is wrong, or that bribery is wrong.").
167 See supra Part I.
168 Robert W. Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and Challenges for the Legal Profession,
59 A.B.A. J. 681, 681 (1973).
169 See supra text accompanying note 166.
170 See infra text accompanying note 179.
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A small number of lawyers engaging in misconduct are
inevitable.171 As Chesterfield Smith, the President of the ABA in
1974 said, "I would hope that someday [lawyers] could get to be
lily-white, but realistically I don't believe that's possible."172
Humans are not infallible and a minority of lawyers will always
fall from grace regardless of the cultural and legal limits society
imposes. Furthermore, attorney discipline, civil lawsuits and
criminal lawsuits give society tools to hold such wrongdoers
accountable for their actions, and to send a deterrent message to
others. The legal profession should, however, continue to
examine whether it can further improve itself through the rules
it has adopted and the culture that it creates within the
profession.173 Even though it is a small number of lawyers who
engage in conduct that diminishes the reputation of the legal
profession, that small number has a profound impact on the
public's perception of the profession.174 Any reduction in that
small number should be of significant benefit to the public and
the legal profession.
If the law plainly prohibited the conduct of many of the
actors in Watergate, then what motivated their decisions? The
conduct of the actors involved in Watergate has, in many
instances, been explained by the context in which the actors were
placed-government offices-and specifically the White House,
with all of its power and prestige.175 There is undoubtedly some
truth to that, but the motivation to please a powerful client can
arise in many other contexts than the White House. In today's
competitive business world, private attorneys must fight to
retain the business of their clients or risk losing income and
frequently jobs.176 This can create incredible pressure to satisfy
171 Rotunda, supra note 136, at 661, 663-65 (listing some malpractice claims based on
ethical violations).
172 See Interview, supra note 166, at 31.
173 See Marianne M. Jennings, The Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics,
Business Ethics, Law, and Virtue: Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 995, 997-98 (2004) (arguing that at the point that a client's fraud begins
"the codified ethical standards and legal prohibitions are inapplicable. Virtue is required
and courage of convictions demanded.").
174 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS vii (2008) ("It takes only a few
betrayals, however, to seriously damage the reputation of lawyers, both individual and
collective. If the legal profession is to prevent breaches of trust, it needs to understand
how and why they occur.").
175 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 79, at 268 ("To a staff associate, even a highly
placed one, the prestige of the Presidential office can be awe-inspiring. In this context, it
takes heroic effort for the subordinate to recognize that a President's whims are not
necessarily made of cast iron.").
176 See ABEL, supra note 174, at 58-59 ("[M]any lawyers feel pressure from clients to
facilitate illegal activity. And 38 percent of Americans believe that 'most lawyers would
engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client in an important case."') (footnotes
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the demands of clients who are not bound by our professional
rules of ethics or frequently even interested in hearing about
them. There continues to be a danger that lawyers' self-interests
create pressure to serve the demands of powerful clients and that
this can at times compromise their judgment and ethics.177 The
Carnegie Foundation noted this danger in its 2007 report on
legal education: "In many professional settings [the] lofty ideals
of public spirit and service to clients can seem far removed from
reality. The press of business demands ... frequently focuses
thoughts elsewhere than on the public purposes of the
profession."178
A brief overview of a couple of more recent stories involving
lawyers will follow to explore, albeit briefly and anecdotally,
other contexts where the lawyers' self-interest in serving clients
lead to problematic conduct. Such conduct frequently has an
adverse effect on third parties and, concomitantly, on the legal
profession.
One of the more notorious recent events was the collapse of
Enron.179 While no lawyers were subject to any criminal charges
or disciplinary action as a result of Enron,180 many people raised
questions about the role lawyers played in its demise.181 Enron's
failure had a grave impact on the interests of third parties as
"more than 4000 employees lost their jobs [and] thousands of
investors also lost their life savings, as '$70 billon in wealth
vanished."'182 Enron's collapse mainly involved corporate
omitted); Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 26 ("The challenges of maintaining
independent judgment are compounded in a competitive market where powerful clients
can shop for expedient rather than for ethical advice.").
177 Jerold S. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287,
1288 (1976) (arguing that "Watergate demonstrated the attitude, all too prevalent in the
modern history of the legal profession, that law should serve power"); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1322-25 (2006) (discussing the
impact of self-interest and group-thinking on ethical reasoning); Susan D. Carle, Power as
a Factor in the Lawyers' Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 118-20 (2006)
(arguing for a model of ethical decision-making that considers the power of one's client in
light of other interests at stake in litigation).
178 CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 126-27 (2007).
179 For an overview of the key facts relating to the collapse of Enron, see Rhode &
Paton, supra note 166, at 13-17.
180 See Lawrence J. Fox, Can Confidentiality Survive Enron, Arthur Anderson, and
the ABA?, 34 STETSON L. REV. 147, 152 (2004) ("Nobody had found that there was a single
lawyer who was aware of things that should have been reported up the corporate ladder
and had failed to do so.").
181 See, e.g., Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat: Bankruptcy Examination
Outlines Possible Causes of Action, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 22-24 (2004); Bernard S. Carrey,
Enron-Where Were the Lawyers?, 27 VT. L. REV. 871, 871-72 (2003); Susan P. Koniak,
Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?, Forbes.com (Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2002/0812/058_print.html.
182 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 9-10; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74.
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officials, accountants and bankers, but lawyers were in the
picture, too.183 Enron had in-house and outside counsel, both of
whom were advising it on the structuring of financial
transactions and financial disclosure requirements.18 4 Enron's
accounting firm, Andersen, also had in-house counsel who
became the center of a controversy regarding the timing of
Andersen's destruction of documents.185
Some legal commentators have argued that the lawyers
should have disclosed their client's misconduct to the Securities
& Exchange Commission.186 Many have viewed this event
through the lens of an attorney's obligations when representing
an organization, as well as an attorney's duty of
confidentiality. 187 Others have viewed the events through the
lens of conflicts of interest.188 For example, Enron's outside
counsel relied on Enron's business for more than seven percent of
its revenues-Enron was the firm's largest client.189 "Over the
years V&E [Vinson & Elkins, Enron's outside counsel] had
represented Enron in a wide range of matters, with Enron paying
the firm legal fees of over $162 million in the five years ending
with 2001."190 The desire to keep that client satisfied must have
been tremendous.
These are certainly valid perspectives from which to view the
Enron scandal. But it is also worth thinking about whether the
lawyers sufficiently considered the impact of their client's
conduct on third parties when they were advising their clients.
Did they consider the impact on all of the retirees who would be
left with no income because of their client's fraud? Did they
consider all of the jobs that would be lost when Enron collapsed?
Certainly the interests of third parties may be legitimately
injured during the course of economic competition and events
such as mergers, downsizing, etc. But when the rights of third
parties are injured because of fraud, the need for the lawyer to
consider third parties' interests becomes particularly heightened.
"As many legal ethics experts note, in cases of client misconduct,
lawyers' professional norms of client loyalty often conflict with
personal norms of honesty and integrity. To reduce the cognitive
183 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74-75.
184 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 17, 19.
185 Id. at 21-24; see also Koniak, supra note 181.
186 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 75.
187 Id.
188 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 25.
189 Id.
190 Bost, supra note 129, at 506.
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dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously dismiss or discount
evidence of misconduct and its impact on third parties."191
The federal government's response to Enron-Sarbanes
Oxley-embodies the idea that "every attorney owes an
obligation to the public separate from an attorney's obligation to
his client."192 This position received strong opposition from the
legal profession.193 The legal profession, however, has been more
accepting of the lawyer's obligation to the public when the lawyer
is a prosecutor. Model Rule 3.8 articulates special duties for
prosecutors, and the comments to that Rule explain that "[a]
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."194
The case that came to be known as the Duke Lacrosse rape
case is a recent notorious example of a prosecutor who did not act
as a minister of justice. Prosecutor Michael Nifong was the
district attorney for Durham County, North Carolina when he
filed rape charges against three lacrosse plavers at Duke
University-all of whom were eventually declared innocent.195
Nifong's overzealous prosecution of the case appears to have been
motivated by a desire to please his "client," i.e. the people of
Durham County who were soon going to choose whether or not to
reelect him.196 The Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the
North Carolina State Bar found that prosecutor Nifong violated
many rules in the Duke Lacrosse rape case, including Rule 3.8.197
The Chairman of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission made
several comments about Nifong's apparent motivation for his
conduct:
[W]hat we have here, it seems, is that we had a prosecutor who was
faced with a very unusual situation in which the confluence of his self-
interest collided with a very volatile mix of race, sex and class ....
But we can make no other conclusion that those initial statements
that he made were to forward his political ambitions . . . . It's an
illustration of the fact that character-good character-is not a
constant. Character is dependent upon the situation. Probably any
one of us could be faced with a situation at some point that would test
191 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 32 (emphasis added).
192 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 82.
193 Id. at 82-83.
194 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
195 N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order of Discipline, at 2 (July 24, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Order], available
at http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%200rder.pdf.
196 Id. See also Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False
Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1354-
57 (2007).
197 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 20-21.
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our good character and we would prove wanting. And that has
happened for Mike Nifong.198
The Chairman also specifically discussed the victims of
Nifong's misconduct, who were "the three young men to start
with, their families, the entire lacrosse team and their coach,
Duke University, the justice system in North Carolina and
elsewhere."199 The subsequent order that disbarred Nifong also
discussed how his conduct harmed third parties:
Nifong's misconduct resulted in significant actual harm to Reade
Seligman, Collin Finnerty, and David Evans and their families ....
As a result of Nifong's misconduct, these young men experienced
heightened public scorn and loss of privacy while facing very serious
criminal charges of which the Attorney General of North Carolina
ultimately concluded they were innocent. 200
Watergate and the two examples discussed above do not
suggest that the lawyers acted with a desire or motivation to
harm the interests of third parties. Their motives differed in
each situation, although to some extent they were all pursing
their self-interests by serving the real or perceived demands of
their clients. The outcome of their conduct in each situation was
similar-they all adversely impacted the interests of third
parties and, concomitantly, the reputation of the legal profession.
Perhaps encouraging lawyers to view their decision-making
process through the lens of the impact on third parties, at least
in part, could help improve lawyer decision-making and
judgment.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE MODEL RULES AND
LEGAL EDUCATION
A. Reforms to the Model Rules
Reforms to the Model Rules alone are unlikely to change the
culture of the legal profession, but they can be an important
component. 201 As this article has suggested, the Rules should
inculcate in lawyers not just a respect for the rule of law, which
is paramount to a government based on laws, but a more
humanistic respect for the interests of third parties. Viewing
conduct through this lens could provide three possible benefits.
198 Comments of Disciplinary Panel's Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke-text.html?pagewanted=all.
199 Id.
200 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 23.
201 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 31 ("Of course, reforming professional rules
will not of itself transform professional culture . . . . Regulation is no substitute for
internalized norms, but it can foster their development and reinforce their exercise.").
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First, it could give a lawyer a perspective to view his or her
conduct that could deter misconduct. Second, even if the conduct
that will harm the interests of a third party is permissible,
thinking about these implications may give lawyers a more
tangible perspective to consider when they are advising their
clients about the "right thing to do." Third, again, even if the
conduct that will harm the interests of a third party is
permissible, thinking about such implications may cause lawyers
to reflect on whether the current rules have struck the right
balance between the interests of clients and the interests of third
parties, or whether legal reform is appropriate.202
Scholars have written about the increase in lawyer
regulation and the decrease in the demoralization of legal ethics
over time.203 Whether or not a lawyer should be a moral advisor
and/or independent moral actor has been a topic of debate in
legal scholarship.204 Even if one did agree that a lawyer should
be a moral advisor, in today's world of moral plurality, there may
not be agreed upon norms explaining what it means to be
"moral," which could meaningfully guide the actions of lawyers.
"Morality" in early codes was strongly tied to Christianity, which
is not of much assistance in today's world of religious diversity in
lawyers' personal lives and secularism in the law. Thus,
returning to broad notions of the lawyer as an autonomous moral
actor may not provide much meaningful guidance. Instead of
focusing on "morality," as a guiding principle for lawyers, it may
be more helpful if the Model Rules articulated more specific
principles that elaborate on what it means to be a "moral"
advisor or actor.
The Model Rules specifically guide lawyers to assess their
conduct in light of compliance with the rule of law, compliance
with their duties to their clients, and compliance with their
duties to the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 205
202 For example, the recent case of Alton Logan, who two lawyers knew had been
wrongfully convicted for twenty-six years because their client had confessed he was the
real killer, has raised anew the debate over a lawyers' duty of confidentiality to his or her
client. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer
Reveal Her Client's Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another?, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811, 816-20 (2011); Harold J. Winston, Learning from Alton
Logan, 2 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 173, 173 (2009).
203 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 85, at 2398-99; Luban & Millemann, supra note 139,
at 41-42.
204 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1317-
19 (2006). This debate is also sometimes framed as a debate between a client-centered
and a justice-centered approach to lawyers' ethical obligations. Carle, supra note 177, at
116-17. The Model Rules do state that when giving legal advice, a lawyer may refer to
other considerations such as moral factors. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2009).
205 Supra Part III.
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The Model Rules, however, are fairly scant in their focus on
assessing the impact of a lawyer's conduct on third parties.206
Thus, it may be beneficial if the Model Rules specifically advised
a lawyer to consider the effects of his or her conduct on the rights
of third parties as part of their ethical decision-making
framework. "When the lawyer fully understands the nature of
his office, he will then discern what restraints are necessary to
keep that office wholesome and effective."207
The Model Rules and its predecessor, the Code, have served
two main functions. One is to set out specific standards that can
be enforced in disciplinary proceedings. The other is to set out
the values and the moral or philosophical framework from which
lawyers should approach ethical decisions.208 In this regard,
perhaps the ABA's decision to eliminate the Canons' aspirational
ethical considerations from the Model Rules was a loss. The
Model Rules focused on setting out the black letter law regarding
the conduct of lawyers in greater detail, but perhaps at the
expense of the more nuanced and complex considerations of the
role of the lawyer that were in the ethical considerations of the
Code. Professor William H. Simon critiqued the Model Rules as
follows:
The way we now tend to teach our students legal ethics in the courses
that have been mandated in the wake of Watergate tends to
emphasize relatively mechanical, unreflective rule-following at the
expense of relatively complex contextual judgment . ... The Model
Rules were explicitly drafted for the purpose of creating black letter
rules (that is the term that the drafters used) that obviate complex
judgment. The predecessor code of the ABA actually had a series of
norms that were designed to inspire complex judgment-the so-called
'ethical considerations'-aspirational norms that were eliminated by
the Model Rules precisely to reduce legal ethics to a matter of black
letter rule following. 209
The idea of inculcating concerns for the interests of third
parties as part of the ethical framework through which lawyers
view their decisions and their advice to their clients would work
better as an ethical aspiration that can inform a lawyer's
approach to ethical decisions than as a rule that could be a basis
for disciplinary enforcement.210 This idea could be included by
206 The Model Rules do provide guidance about the treatment of third parties in
specific situations. See supra Part III.
207 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
208 Supra Part II.
209 Simon, supra note 140, at 670-71.
210 See Tondel, supra note 39, at 296 (concluding that "[n]o Code amendment could
give practical expression to that revulsion" caused by the crimes committed by lawyers
1452012]
Chapman Law Review
reintroducing something akin to the Code's ethical considerations
or by incorporating it into the current Preamble to the Model
Rules, which does set out the broad framework regarding a
lawyer's role.211 For example, the Preamble could be revised to
include this concept in Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the Preamble. The
proposed additional language is in italics:
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions.
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a
lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about
them to the client or to others. [As an officer of the legal system, a
lawyer shall be loyal to the client. This should not, however preclude a
lawyer from considering, as part of the lawyer's ethical decision-
making, the rights and interests of third parties that may be adversely
affected by either the lawyer's conduct or the client's conduct.]212
[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities
are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional
Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the
framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles
include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a
client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all
persons involved in the legal system. [These principles also include
the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the legal system. While a
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client is usually paramount, the lawyer
should consider whether a course of conduct taken by a client or on
behalf of a client would adversely impact the interests of third parties.
There are many times when this outcome is legitimate, but sometimes
involved in Watergate); Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in the Lawyers' Ethical
Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 137 (2006) (discussing the discretion frequently
exercised in lawyers' ethical decision-making and the inability of the positive law to
determine what a lawyer should or should not do in every instance).
211 The Scope of the Rules states that the Rules do not "however, exhaust the moral
and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity
can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the
ethical practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 16 (2009).
212 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (2009).
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it can be a sign of illegal conduct by a client or misconduct by a lawyer.
Even if the law allows for an outcome that adversely impacts the
interests of third parties, a lawyer should still discuss with his or her
client whether such an outcome is the right thing to do.]213
B. Reforms to Legal Education
In addition to considering revisions to the Model Rules, legal
education would be an important component in training lawyers
to consider the impact of their conduct on the interests of third
parties as part of their ethical decision-making. In the wake of
Watergate there have been differing views about the importance
that law schools have historically placed on educating and
training students in the matter of ethics.214 Legal education
continues to receive some criticism about how it teaches
professionalism, which includes education about the law of
lawyering, in addition to matters of morality and character.215
Some legal commentators have criticized legal education,
particularly the area of legal ethics, as being too morally
neutral.216 One law student commented, "[W]e don't focus on
what is right, we just talk about what is legally feasible."217
One commentator suggested that part of the circumstances
leading to Watergate included legal education's agenda of
banishing emotionality from lawyers' work.218 The Carnegie
Foundation's 2007 report on legal education concluded that "[t]he
kind of personal maturity that graduates need in order to
practice law with integrity and a sense of purpose requires not
only skills, but qualities such as compassion, respectfulness and
commitment."219
Legal ethics pedagogy may benefit from the growing dialogue
about teaching law students emotional intelligence. Emotional
intelligence has been defined as "a set of emotional competencies
involving self-awareness of emotions, empathetic awareness of
the emotions of others, and the ability to use this awareness to
213 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 9 (2009).
214 See, e.g., Burbank & Duboff, supra note 105, at 17 (commenting on the "apparent
dearth of interest in and emphasis upon ethics exhibited by the fountainhead of legal
training and conditioning, the law schools themselves"); compare with Weckstein, supra
note 42, at 264 (countering allegations that legal education does not focus on ethics and
asserting that "law schools do teach ethics, probably more and better than ever in
history").
215 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 136; see also Luban & Millemann, supra note
139, at 37-38.
216 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 149.
217 Id. at 152.
218 Andrew S. Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency
Disease, 26 J. LEGAL EDUc. 441, 443-44 (1974).
219 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 146.
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influence the behavior of others."220 For purposes of this
discussion, the concept of empathy is the most important and the
following is a helpful definition:
"Empathy encompasses several related phenomena: (1)
feeling the emotions of another; (2) understanding another's
situation or experience; and (3) taking actions based on another's
situation. Empathy involves ways of knowing and understanding
and can serve as a catalyst for either action or restraint."221 In
this broader view, empathy is an essential element of the concept
of emotional intelligence. "Empathy, when it primarily involves
sympathy, leads to helping behaviors and even altruism .... So
viewed, that aspect of empathy has little role in actual
adversarial proceedings."222
Research supports the proposition that lawyers with high
levels of emotional competencies are more successful persuaders,
communicators, and influencers and should be "more likely to
give high priority to other interests, such as improving the justice
system."223 This is important because lawyers have the daily
opportunity in their practice "to set by their example, and even
induce by their persuasion, standards of truth and right in our
society at large [.]"224
Much work has been done on teaching legal ethics in context
by using problems that give students an opportunity to address
ethical issues through different roles.225 Problem-based teaching
has also been identified as an important tool for teaching
emotional intelligence.22 6  While current scholarship focuses
largely on emotional intelligence regarding a lawyer's
understanding of his or her emotions and the client's emotions,227
one way to foster the expansion of legal morality is to include, in
legal ethics education, problems that focus on recognizing and
220 Montgomery, supra note 8, at 326.
221 Id. at 337.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 347.
224 Tondel, supra note 39, at 298. For this reason, how law firms teach young lawyers
about ethics and values is also an important component of a lawyer's education. See
Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers are Different and Why We Are the Same: Creating
Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior-In-House Ethics
Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 703-07
(2011).
225 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 50, at 675 (discussing teaching legal ethics in context);
Reaves, supra note 55, at 35 (discussing Professor Sam Dash's approach to teaching legal
ethics post-Watergate, where the materials should "constantly place the student in
situations requiring role definitions . . . . [Riole-playing is essential.").
226 See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 1173, 1198-1200 (1999).
227 See, e.g., Jan Salisbury M.S., Emotional Intelligence in Law Practice, 53
ADVOCATE 38 (2010); Silver, supra note 226, at 1202-03.
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empathizing with the interests of third parties. "To a large
extent people behave as they are expected to behave, and their
expectations arise less from what they are told than from the
examples they observe."228
CONCLUSION
There is no one explanation that can account for lawyers'
improper involvement in Watergate or for other events that have
involved lawyers, harmed third parties, and tarnished the
reputation of the legal profession. ABA President Robert
Meserve suggested that "[t]he first lesson of Watergate for us
then may be that we must constantly preserve our professional
independence and detachment-not only from the overzealous
client who seeks what is improper, but from the urgings of our
own ambition and self-interest."229 As this article has argued,
one way to do this may be to steer lawyers back to being morally
accountable actors, but in a way that provides specific guidance
about what it means to be "moral." Considering the impact of a
course of action on the interests of third parties is one aspect of
being a moral lawyer. The profession could start to inculcate the
consideration of the interests of third parties as a component of a
lawyer's decision-making process by reforms to the Model Rules
and to legal education. In doing so, lawyers may be better
enabled to fulfill one commentator's reflections about the role of
the lawyer post-Watergate:
We are not the keeper of our clients' consciences, but neither are we
mere technicians whose sole function is to assure that legal
limitations are narrowly observed. . . . We fulfill the finest standards
of our profession when our informed legal opinion is supplemented by
judicious counsel. Without undertaking to preach to our clients, we
can encourage them to ask us not just "is it legal?" but "is it right?"230
228 Weckstein, supra note 42, at 278.
229 Robert Meserve, Our Profession and Watergate, 2 STUDENT LAW. 9, 60 (1973).
230 Richardson, supra note 79, at 271.
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